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SA/DDO [REDACTED]
19 April 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Lehman,
Assistant to the DCI

FROM : [REDACTED]
Special Assistant to the DDO

SUBJECT : Mr. William Bundy's Letter to the
Director dated April 6, 1976
Regarding CIA's Ability to
Attract Academics

REFERENCE : Director's Note to Mr. Lehman
on Subject, [Executive Registry
Number 76-7399/3]

1. The DDO is not in a particularly good position to comment on Bill Bundy's argument that top grade academics are disinclined to work with CIA because of its involvement with clandestine operations. I wonder, however, if he is not exaggerating this problem, particularly in view of the current depressed state of the market for academics. The most recent statistics on unemployed or underemployed PhD's make depressing reading.

2. What I am in a position to comment on is the benefits to be derived from the analyst remaining near to the DDO officers. Recent post mortems stress the need for a very close contact between the analyst and the DDO collector. Without it a proper evaluation of DDO's raw intelligence is very difficult to make. No source description suitable for formal dissemination can possibly convey the true value and reliability of a source or his information. This can be done only by a close, informal relationship between the analyst and the case officer.

3. Another benefit derives from the DDO case officer's usual first-hand familiarity with a situation. While he may not have the analytical acumen of an academic or analyst (although his academic credentials may in fact be of

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high order), his recent on-the-spot knowledge of the place and its leaders are invaluable in the analysis process. If, for example, the situation in country X is under study, someone who has lived there and is personally close to the King, Prime Minister or other influential leaders of the country has an advantage over an analyst whose knowledge is vicarious. This factor may be less important in the case of a large European democracy where the decision making process is more dispersed and subtle, and where the chances of our case officer knowing the principals are less, but the man-on-the-spot may still have a "feel" which cannot otherwise be duplicated. Bill's point that the DDO is expert only on the "dark side" of politics is not true. And while the contributions of DDO officers may tend to concern short range rather long range consideration they are no less valuable or important to the analysis process.

4. Moreover, the thesis that the DDO is consumed by the Soviet or Chinese target almost to the exclusion of reporting on other countries is exaggerated. The statistics of our reporting bear this out.

5. Bill minimizes the problem of dividing our administration mechanism into two parts. Not to mention the temporary dislocations which would be involved by this process, the cost would be considerable. Moreover, this is no time to add the trauma of a major reorganization to the Agency's current agonies.

6. But, even if there were merit to separating the DDI from the DDO, what does one do with the DDS&T? Part of its role is analytical, part is collection.

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DDS&T also requires the cooperation of academics and academe. Yet, DDS&T does, according to Bill Bundy's thesis, suffer as well as gain from association with DDO.

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Bill Bundy makes most of his case for the creation of bureaucratically separate overt and covert intelligence agencies on three "vital" gains:

- (1) Recruitment of better talent.
- (2) The perspectives gained by extensive outside contacts.
- (3) The constructive benefits gained by having analysts in contact with "experts and men of wisdom" who are not part of intelligence.

John McMahon has spoken to (1). The following remarks will demonstrate that time and memory, and other factors I am sure, have dimmed Bundy's perceptions of what the intelligence world is like, particularly in regard to (2) and (3).

It is true that the cumulative toll of Vietnam, Watergate, and the many investigations of intelligence, has affected the way we do business with academe. Large numbers of academics and other men of wisdom who consult with us on substantive matters--sometimes for pay, and sometimes not--prefer that their association

not be a matter for general public discussion. Though these relations may be much less visible than formerly, they are surprisingly extensive and are singularly valuable to the intelligence production function. A listing of these contacts would include virtually all of the prestigious universities and colleges in the country and a rather dazzling roster of academic luminaries.

Some of the parameters of our outside contacts with the academic world speak for themselves:

- a casual survey shows that the DDI maintains some 200 academic contacts in about 80 universities.
- the major production offices have on-going relationships with some 15 "think tanks."
- we include 14 US firms among those we contact on a regularized basis for substantive and technical advice.
- the three offices producing the bulk of our in-depth research--OER, OSR, OPR--have well established

programs for outside review of both their planned research programs and the final product. In each case these panels or groups of consultants consist of the most renowned academic in their specialty.

-- our substantive exchanges with the academic world are illustrated by the following activities during the second half of 1975:

- 63 finished intelligence items were sent to 170 different recipients for comment.
- 13 academicians were guests of the Agency for substantive seminars ranging from the "world recession" to the Middle East.
- 109 DDI analysts, openly identified as CIA, attended 58 professional meetings. Thirty-two of these analysts presented papers or were panel discussants at these meetings.

- 17 DDI analysts visited 13 campuses to make substantive presentations.
- we maintain personal contacts for recruiting leads with a large number of academics-- including William Bundy.
- we have formal consultant and/or independent contractor arrangements with academics from 16 colleges and universities.
- our program to release unclassified finished intelligence through the Library of Congress Document Exchange System (DOCEX) is building more academic contacts and exchanges. This year we anticipate that some 200 DOCEX subscribers will receive 80 CIA intelligence publications.

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